Introduction
In 'Ceteris Paribus, There is No Problem of Provisos ' (1999) , John Earman and John T.
Roberts defend the view that the laws of fundamental physics are expressed by universal generalizations. These fundamental physical laws, Earman and Roberts argue, are strict laws and not qualified by ceteris paribus clauses. As physics, the special sciences also use generalizations to explain, to predict and to intervene. But, in contrast to physics, these generalizations should not be understood as strict universal laws. Earman and Roberts's proposal is to interpret non-strict special science generalizations as statistical generalizations about correlations. Earman and Roberts claim that the statistical generalizations are not qualified by ceteris paribus (henceforth, cp) conditions. As a consequence of their view, neither the law statements of fundamental physics nor special science generalizations are cp-law statements. Hence, they conclude, there simply is no problem of provisos (that is, cp-conditions) that philosophers ought to address. In a sequel to Earman and Roberts (1999) , Earman, Roberts and Smith pitilessly break the In order to provide a clear foundation for the discussion of the statistical account, I first review a useful distinction that is commonly drawn in the recent literature on cp-laws.
Then I introduce Lange's dilemma for accounts of special science laws.
1. cp-conditions are non-lazy open iff the list of conditions cannot be completednot even with the best and complete knowledge from all scientific disciplinesbecause the list of conditions is open-ended or infinite (Earman and Roberts 1999: 439, 441, 444, 467; Earman et al. 2002: 284) . 3 See Unterhuber (this volume) for a critical discussion of this claim. 4 Earman et al. discuss this point explicitly: "There are two reasons why one might not be able to make explicit a more precise conditional [i.e. a strict law or a lazy cp-law]:
(1) we do not know how to state the conditions under which the qualified regularity holds; or (2) there is reason to suspect that even with the best of knowledge, these conditions could not be made explicit, because they will comprise an indefinitely large set. The first possibility is not really relevant here; a putative example of a CP law whose CP clause could not be eliminated just because we didn't know how to eliminate it would not show that physics actually discovers CP laws, only that it might. For all we know, future empirical research could reveal the conditions under which the regularity obtains." (Earman et al. 2002: 284) a strict generalization, because there may be state interventions and other factors not mentioned in the law statement, which lead to counter-instances to the strict generalization. This is the first horn of the dilemma (falsity). If, on the other hand, the law is hedged by a (non-lazy) cp-clause, then the law statement reads 'if the supply of a commodity increases and the demand is constant, the price decreases -unless an interfering factors occurs'. If the claim about interfering factors is not made more precise and it cannot be expressed as a list of lazy cp-conditions, then the laws statement in question is in danger of lacking empirical content. This is the second horn of the dilemma (triviality). I refer to this dilemma as 'Lange's dilemma' (named after Marc Lange [1993: 235] ; Reutlinger et al. 2011 : section 4). Earman and Roberts (1999: 448-460) raise forceful objections to accounts of cp-law statements. They conclude their discussion with the pessimistic verdict that accounts of non-lazy cp-law statements are "in sum, a royal mess" (Earman and Roberts 1999: 471) . However, their main line of argument is that even if no such account can be provided, this is not a problem for philosophers who aim at understanding the role of laws in the sciences, because neither the fundamental physical laws nor special science generalizations are qualified by non-lazy cp-conditions. The laws of physics and generalizations of the special sciences hold if lazy conditions of application are satisfied. Lazy conditions of application do not deserve to be counted as genuine cp-conditions. Hence, Earman and Roberts argue that there is no "problem of provisos", which philosophers ought to solve.
The Statistical Account
Earman and Roberts grant that cp-laws may figure in "unfinished" scientific theories as "an element of a 'work in progress', an embryonic theory on its way to being developed to the point where it makes definite claims about the world" (Earman and Roberts 1999: 466) . Cp-laws might play a role in the "context of discovery" of generalizations that are precise, well-defined and not qualified by non-lazy cpconditions. In the case of the special sciences, such a well-defined and precise generalization is a statistical generalization; in physics, it is a strict law. Whereas strict laws and statistical generalizations deserve philosophical analysis, because they are part of "finished" theories, cp-laws do not deserve the same philosophical attention since the latter are merely part of "work-in-progress" or "embryonic" theories (Earman and Roberts 1999: 465-466) . 6 The statistical account portrays special science generalizations as statements about "actual correlations among variables" (Earman and Roberts 1999: 467) . These statements assert "a certain precisely defined statistical relation among well-defined variables" (Earman and Roberts 1999: 467) of the following form:
In population H, a variable P is positively statistically correlated with variable S across all sub-populations that are homogeneous with respect to the variables V 1 , …, V n . (Earman and Roberts 1999: 467) .
In general, two event types F and G are correlated iff F is statistically relevant for G.
That is, F is positively statistically relevant for G -that is, P(G|F) > P(G|not-F); or F 6 It is a strong and highly non-trivial claim that if some notion N is part of an "unfinished" theory, then N does not deserve philosophical attention. A friend of non-lazy cplaws could question this assumption, but I will accept it for the sake of the argument. has negative statistical relevance for G -that is, P(G|F) < P(G|not-F). Earman and Roberts stress that statistical relevance usually concerns the relevance of F for G given that other variables V 1 , … V n take certain values v 1 , …, v n . In statistics, claims about correlations are typically interpreted as straightforward claims about relative frequencies. A relative frequency is the proportion of Gs among the Fs in a given domain (for instance, the proportion of people suffering from heart disease among the smokers in Great Britain). F is positively statistically relevant for G, if the frequency of Gs among the Fs is higher than the frequency of Gs among the non-Fs in a given domain (for instance, the proportion of people in Great Britain suffering from heart disease who also smoke is greater than the proportion of people suffering from heart disease who do not smoke).
Earman and Roberts present an example from Jeffrey Paiges's study of revolutions in agrarian societies: in agrarian societies, the economic organization of labor is strongly positively correlated with political activities. According to Paiges' study, there are two kinds of organizing labor: commercial hacienda systems (run by a single owner, with little autonomy of the workers) and plantation systems (run autonomously by the workers); political activities considered are revolts and labor reforms. Earman and Roberts hold that the above special science generalization should be reconstructed as follows: in all intended applications (that is, all agrarian societies, in which the values of the specified variables V 1 , …, V n are fixed), there is a high positive non-strict correlation between commercial hacienda systems and agrarian revolt, as well as between plantation systems and labor reform.
The statistical account is promising in three respects: first, Earman and Roberts claim that the account dispenses with dubious non-lazy cp-clauses. The conditions expressed by the fact that the variables V 1 , …, V n take the values v 1 , …, v n are lazy condi-tions, such as the "proximity of progressive urban political parties" (Earman and Roberts 1999: 468) . Second, non-lazy cp-conditions are not required to capture the 'nonstrict' and 'exception-ridden' character of special science generalizations, because statements about non-strict correlation naturally allow for exceptions. Third, it is rather uncontroversial that statistical generalization -unlike non-lazy cp-law statements -can be confirmed by evidence. In total, if the statistical account could be defended, the payoff would be considerable.
To be fair, Earman and Roberts's view about the scope of the statistical account is vague. It is unclear whether the account is intended to cover all special science laws. 
Statistical Generalizations -Not So Lazy After All
The first objection to the statistical account is that it does not get rid of non-lazy cp-conditions (cf. Hüttemann and Reutlinger [2013: section 6] for the original version of the argument, which is elaborated here). If this is true, then the objection undermines the claim that the statistical account dispenses with non-lazy cp-conditions. This challenge is inspired by Carl Hempel's critical remark that a statistical account "faces the difficulty that scientific theories do not, in general, provide probabilistic laws that would obviate the need for provisos" (Hempel 1988: 152-153) .
If the statistical account is true, then all special science generalizations describe correlations between variables given that other variables V 1 , …, V n are held fixed at particular values v 1 , …v n . Generalizations about correlations merely involve lazy cpconditions -that is, a set of conditions 8 V 1 =v 1 , …, V n =v n that is finite (i.e. not nonlazy open ) and entirely in the scope of the special science in question (i.e. not nonlazy scope ). The question I want to press is whether advocates of the statistical account are justified to claim that the relevant conditions are indeed lazy cp-conditions. This is not the case, or so I will argue, because sometimes a subset of the relevant conditions is not within the conceptual and methodological scope of the discipline in question. That is, I claim that there are cases of the following structure: F and G are actually correlated
given V 1 =v 1 , …, V n =v n in population P and the correlation depends on the presence (or absence) of a non-lazy scope condition C. I propose to understand the claim 'a correlation depends on non-lazy condition C' as a claim about the failure of stability of a correlation under changes in C. Borrowing Woodward's (2010: 291-293) concept of stability, a correlation between F and G depends on background condition C iff the correlation fails to be stable (i.e. ceases to exist) under changes in C. More precisely, the actual correlation of Fs and Gs in population P depends on an actual non-lazy scope condition C obtaining in P iff the following subjunctive conditional is true: if C were not present, then the correlation of Fs and Gs would break down or, at least, be different than it actually is. Following Woodward's 'counterfactual' approach to stability, the subjunctive conditional might refer to another 'local' actual population, in which C is not present; the antecedent may also refer to a counterfactual population, in which C does not obtain. To illustrate the former case, suppose there is a correlation among economic variables obtaining in Spain but not in India (despite the fact that other variables are constant in both countries), because the existence of the correlation depends a (non-lazy) condition C, which actually prevails in Spain and which is actually absent in India. In this scenario, the relevant subjunctive conditional -assessing the dependence on Crefers to an actual local population (in India). However, the subjunctive conditional might also appeal to hypothetical populations, in which C is not satisfied, in order to determine whether a correlation depends on the actual condition C (see the examples below). Of course, evaluating such a counterfactual requires drawing on our background knowledge (including physical theories), which often allows us to infer what would happen in the absence of C. But this should not come as a surprise, if we are talking about non-lazy cp-conditions. 9
Consider two examples instantiating this structure. First, according to the statistical account, economic generalizations such as 'rational agents maximize their expected utilities' and 'if the supply of a commodity increases and the demand remains constant, the price decreases' are reinterpreted as statements about actual non-strict correlations such as: an increase in supply is actually correlated with a decrease of the price given the demand is constant. However, this correlation depends on the (nonlazy) complex background condition C that the agents interacting on the market are actually not repeatedly drugged, not disrupted by the outbreak of war or natural catastrophes, not subject to mass brain surgery etc. How does one determine whether this actual correlation (in some population P) depends on such a condition C? Following the recipe introduced above, the actual correlation depends on C iff the correlation breaks down in another local actual or a hypothetical population P*, in which C is not satis- To sum up, the statistical account does not succeed in solving a problem it is designed for: it fails to dispense with non-lazy cp-conditions. 11
Do Statistical Generalizations Sometimes Lie?
The second objection to the statistical account targets the claim that all special science Strevens's accounts). This list of alternatives is certainly not exhaustive but I believe that the discussion suffices to establish that idealized generalizations pose a problem for the statistical account.
Laws about Frequencies
Earman and Roberts introduce the statistical account in terms of "actual correlations among variables" (Earman and Roberts 1999: 467 I agree with the critics that the concept of approximation is not helpful to improve our understanding of idealizations, because the notions of approximation and approximate truth stand in as much need of clarification as the notion of idealization does (Strevens 2008) . Backmann and Reutlinger (2014) provide an in depth discussion of approximation and other accounts of idealizations.
cal discussion of hypothetical frequentism including objections targeting the idealized assumptions of this view).
Alternatives to Frequentism?
Proponents of the statistical account are not committed to a version of frequentism.
Instead they might adopt an alternative interpretation of the (objective) According to Cartwright's dilemma, idealized laws are either literally false or they lack empirical strength, because they are vacuously true. I will discuss whether adopting the BSA can avoid Cartwright's dilemma.
First, suppose one opts for taking idealized law statements to be literally false.
The standard version of the BSA requires that each and every axiom (and theorem) of the best system be a (contingently) true proposition, according to Lewis (1994 ) and others (including Earman 1986 , Cohen and Callender 2009 Or a proponent of the BSA drops the veridicality requirement -i.e. the axioms and theorems of the best system may be literally false statements if they offer the best balance of simplicity and strength. Braddon-Mitchell (2001) defends such a non-standard 'instrumentalist' version of the BSA, which is compatible with accepting the falsity of idealized laws. However, I am discussing the standard version that requires law statements to be true.
Secondly, could one happily accept that vacuously true statements are axioms of the best system? A Humean might argue that idealized laws qua being vacuous laws earn their place in the best system, because idealized laws lead to a gain in simplicity that outweighs the superior fit of more realistic models (as a referee suggested). 17 Newton's first law might be an example fitting this characterization, because it may be taken as a proposition about actually non-instantiated behavior in the absence of forces (inertial behavior), which simplifies the overall theory. Call this strategy of justifying that a vacuous truth earns its place in the best system the 'simplification argument'. I concede that the BSA may be able to deal with some idealizations by appealing to the simplification argument. However, it remains to be shown whether this simplification argument applies to all idealized laws (for instance, to laws that apply if economic agents are perfectly rational, if mating is random, or if the molecules in a gas do not collide, and so on; cf. Strevens 2008: chapter 8) . Whether the simplification argument can indeed be successfully applied to all idealized laws depends on an elaboration of the concepts of simplicity and strength (as used in the BSA). I side with Woodward's (forthcoming) and van Fraassen's (1989: 55-59) criticism that it is difficult to judge the soundness of arguments such as the simplification argument, because the central notions of simplicity and strength, to which the friends of best systems appeal, are (a) notoriously unclear (and often taken to be primitive) and (b) it is, to say the least, an entirely open question whether the notions of simplicity and strength (as figuring in the BSA) play any role in the sciences at all.
Even if an idealized law is not an axiom it may be a theorem of the best system: the axioms might entail a vacuously true (statistical) generalization. This idea is in the spirit of the mentaculus approach, according to which all special science laws are theorems of the best system. If it were the case the axioms of the mentaculus entailed all the probabilistic special science laws, then some of these theorems might be vacuously true. According to this approach, the idealized probabilistic laws of the special sciences just are the vacuously true probabilistic theorems of the mentaculus -and, in the context of the statistical account, the vacuously true theorems of the mentaculus that are statements about correlations. This strategy embraces the vacuity horn of Cartwright's dilemma. The most urgent trouble with adopting this strategy is that there is no positive evidence to believe that the mentaculus does in fact entail all of the required special science laws (about correlations). Although one might grant that Albert and Loewer convincingly show that the second law of thermodynamics is a theorem of the mentaculus, the critics correctly insist that it is an entirely open question whether this success can be extended to laws of the special sciences in general (Cohen and Callender [2010: 437-439]; Weslake forthcoming). Therefore, the mentaculus account cannot be used to interpret idealized special science generalizations as vacuous statements about correlations.
Strevens's Account of Deterministic Probabilities. Michael Strevens accounts
for special science macro-probabilities by way of explaining statistical patterns as the result of a process that involves two kinds of facts: (a) deterministic dynamical micro-laws describing an underlying micro-process, and (b) a probability distribution over initial conditions. For instance, a statistical pattern, which Strevens aims to explain, is that a sequence of (actual) coin tosses and outcomes of heads and tails is a Bernoulli process with the probability of 0.5 (Strevens 2003: 30; Strevens 2008: 369) . Statistical patterns are "a certain sort of long-term statistical order, namely, a stable frequency or sets of frequencies" (Strevens 2003: 30) . The explanation of a statistical pattern requires that the micro-dynamics have a feature Strevens calls "micro-constancy", while the probability distribution over initial conditions ought to be "macro-periodic" (Strevens 2003: 47-60; Strevens 2008: 368-379) . The basic idea of these requirements is as follows: the micro-laws are micro-constant if (1) a small change in initial microconditions can lead -in according with the dynamical micro-laws -to a different outcome, and (2) for any 'small' region in the space of possible initial conditions, the proportion of different initial conditions producing particular types of outcomes is the same. Macro-periodicity is a 'smoothness' requirement for the probability distribution over initial conditions.
Concerning the merit of the statistical account, the crucial question is whether
Strevens's account applies to all special science generalizations including idealized ones. Strevens's account applies iff two conditions are satisfied: first, each and every special science generalization instantiates a statistical pattern. Second, each of these patterns can be explained with the help of micro-constant laws and a macro-periodic probability distribution over initial conditions. Cartwright's dilemma is a reason to believe that the first condition is not generally met, because some special science laws are idealized and do not instantiate statistical patterns. Since statistical patterns are nothing but long-term stable frequencies, the objection targeted against the actual frequentist reading (see above) can be reapplied here: if an idealized law is taken to be literally false, then it is not a good guide to the 'correct' frequencies in the world; if the law is vacuously true, then it does not represent frequencies at all and lacks empirical strength. Thus, Cartwright's dilemma supports the claim that Strevens's account of macro-probabilities cannot be applied to idealized laws of the special sciences.
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This result need not worry Strevens, because he does not adopt the statistical account. Instead he provides independent accounts of deterministic and probabilistic special science laws (Strevens 2008: ch. 7, 10) , non-lazy cp-laws (Strevens 2012) , andmost strikingly -of idealizations in terms of factors that do not make an explanatory difference (Strevens 2008: chapter 8) .
To recap section 5, I have discussed three interpretations of the objective probabilities referred to in statements about correlations (frequentism, the mentaculus, and
Strevens's account). None of these interpretations support the claim that idealized laws can be straightforwardly understood as laws about correlations. This result shows that the statistical account is not a complete account of special science laws.
Conclusion
According to the statistical account, special science laws are laws about correlations. At first glance, this account is attractive because it captures the non-strict character of special science generalizations without commitment to potentially problematic non-lazy cp-conditions. I have presented two challenges to the statistical account. According to the first challenge, the statistical account does not get rid of non-lazy cp-conditions. This result undermines one of the alleged central advantages of the statistical account.
The second challenge is that the statistical account, qua general theory of special science laws, is weakened by the fact that idealized law statements resist a purely statistical interpretation.
